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The paper reconsiders the role of money and banking in monetary policy analysis by including a banking
sector and money in an optimizing model otherwise of a standard type.  The model is implemented
quantitatively, with a calibration based on U.S. data.  It is reasonably successful in providing an endogenous
explanation for substantial steady-state differentials between the interbank policy rate and (i) the collateralized
loan rate, (ii) the uncollateralized loan rate, (iii) the T-bill rate, (iv) the net marginal product of capital,
and (v) a pure intertemporal rate.  We find a differential of over 3 % pa between (iii) and (iv), thereby
contributing to resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Dynamic impulse response functions imply
pro-or-counter-cyclical movements in an external finance premium that can be of quantitative significance.
 In addition, they suggest that a central bank that fails to recognize the distinction between interbank
and other short rates could miss its appropriate settings by as much as 4% pa.  Also, shocks to banking
productivity or collateral effectiveness call for large responses in the policy rate.
Marvin Goodfriend













  Recent years have seen great changes in monetary policy analysis, as economists in central 
banks and academia have come together on an analytical approach of the general type discussed by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), 
Woodford (2003), and many others.  This approach is characterized, as argued by McCallum 
(2002), by investigations of alternative rules for monetary policy conducted in models that are based 
on private-agent optimizing behavior but with specifications that include features designed to lend 
empirical veracity, thereby aspiring to be structural and accordingly usable (in principle) for policy 
analysis. Despite a widespread belief that this approach is fundamentally sound, and that recent 
work represents a major improvement over the practice typical 15 or 20 years ago, there are some 
reasons for unease.  Prominent among these are the absence from the standard framework of any 
significant role for monetary aggregates, financial intermediation, or distinctions among various 
short-term interest rates that play different roles in the transmission mechanism.   
  A recent paper by Goodfriend (2005) develops a qualitative framework designed to 
overcome these particular weaknesses.  Specifically, it “… integrates broad money demand, loan 
production, asset pricing, and arbitrage between banking and asset markets” (2005, p. 277) and 
illustrates the logical necessity (in principle) for monetary policy to take account of—among other 
things—the difference between the interbank rate of interest (used as the policy instrument) and 
other short rates including the government bond rate, the collateralized bank loan rate, the (nominal) 
net marginal product of capital, and a shadow nominal intertemporal rate—each of which differs 
from the others.  As noted by Hess (2005), however, Goodfriend (2005) provides no evidence or 
argument concerning the quantitative importance of these features and distinctions.  The primary 
objective of the present paper, accordingly, is to formulate a quantitative version of Goodfriend’s 
model, develop a plausible calibration, and utilize this model to assess the magnitude and policy   2
relevance of the effects and distinctions just mentioned for steady state interest rates and aggregate 
variables, and for dynamic monetary policy simulations.  Among other things, the paper will 
investigate the role of the “external finance premium” that is emphasized in the prominent work of 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).  It will do so using a model in which the external finance 
premium is endogenously determined by no-arbitrage relationships in an environment in which loan 
production depends upon both collateral and loan-monitoring inputs, with capital serving less 
efficiently as collateral than bonds, while bank-deposit money is crucial for facilitating transactions.  
In this setting, the external finance premium may move either pro-cyclically or counter-cyclically in 
response to shocks, depending upon parameters of the model.   
  How does the present paper compare with previous efforts to outline and quantify the role of 
financial intermediation (banking) in monetary policy?  Probably the most prominent line of work 
of this type is that begun by Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) and continued by Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999), but the literature also includes notable contributions by Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kocherlakota (2000), Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004), 
and others.  It is apparently the case, however, that in all of these studies the models are 
fundamentally non-monetary—i.e., do not recognize the existence of a demand for money that 
serves to facilitate transactions.
1  This omission could be of first-order importance for the financial 
accelerator, however, for its mechanism works via increases in the supply of collateral induced by 
asset price increases.  In models with money, however, such increases also increase the demand for 
collateral as spenders go to the banking system for additional money to facilitate the additional 
spending induced by the initiating shock.  Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the net effect of 
these offsetting forces. 
  Our model’s “banking accelerator” transmission effects work in much the same way as the 
                                                 
1 Diamond and Rajan (2006) is a noteworthy qualitative study of the role of banking in monetary policy.   3
financial accelerator does in existing models. For instance, monetary policy that stimulates 
employment and output in the presence of sticky prices raises the marginal product of capital, the 
price of capital, and the value of collateral in the economy, thereby tending to reduce the external 
finance premium for a given quantity of bank deposits demanded.  However, our model includes in 
addition “banking attenuator” effects, which recognize that monetary stimulus to spending also 
increases the demand for bank deposits, thereby tending to raise the external finance premium for a 
given value of collateral-eligible assets in the economy. 
  Also of some indirect relevance to the present exploration are the studies of Ireland (2003), 
McCallum (2001), and Woodford (2003, pp. 300-311), which seek to quantify the effects of 
neglecting monetary aggregates in model specifications that do not adopt the usual approximation 
that is necessary to keep monetary aggregate magnitudes from appearing in the intertemporal 
optimizing conditions of a standard policy-analysis model.  These papers, all of which found only 
small effects of this approximation, did not include any explicit banking sector, however, and did 
not recognize distinctions among various short-term interest rates. 
  In effect, ours is a two-sector model with a goods-producing sector and a banking sector. 
Goods are produced with capital and work effort as usual. The banking sector produces loans (and 
thus deposits) according to a production function with inputs of monitoring effort and collateral, the 
latter consisting of government bonds and capital (employed in the goods-producing sector) held by 
households.  The distinctions among various interest rates arise in the model because loans and 
deposits are costly to produce, in the sense that they require work effort, while collateral services 
allow an economization of that effort.  Hence, the total return on bonds (or capital) has an explicit 
pecuniary component and also an implicit liquidity service-yield component that reflects the 
collateral services that this asset provides.  Portfolio balance requires risk-adjusted equality between 
the various assets’ total returns.  Thus the sum of pecuniary and service-yield returns must equal a   4
shadow total nominal risk-adjusted interest rate.  However, the pecuniary bond rate is less than the 
net nominal marginal product of capital because bonds are more productive as collateral than 
capital. In equilibrium the interbank rate, which is the cost of loanable funds for a bank, is below the 
(uncollateralized) loan rate by the marginal cost of loan production. Finally, the loan market and the 
asset markets are linked by a no-arbitrage condition between the uncollateralized loan rate and the 
shadow total nominal rate.
2  
  The strategy of the paper is two-fold. First, it is to use observed average historical values of 
interest rates and rate spreads, together with observations on banking and macroeconomic 
aggregates, to calibrate parameters by reference to steady-state equilibrium values for the model 
with realistic trend productivity growth in the production of goods and loans.  Our aim in this regard 
is to determine the extent to which the introduction of money and banking into an otherwise 
standard growth model can account for observable interest rate differentials, and how much money 
and banking matters quantitatively (on average) for aggregates like the capital stock, employment, 
and output.  In this regard, we develop the implications of money and banking with reference to the 
famous equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985), summarized by Campbell (1999) as 
the puzzle of “why the average real stock return is so high in relation to the short-term interest rate.”  
  The second part of our strategy is to linearize the model around the calibrated steady state to 
explore how much the inclusion of money and banking matters quantitatively for an otherwise 
standard “new neoclassical synthesis” (aka, “new Keynesian”) model of monetary policy.  In 
particular, we wish to investigate quantitatively how much a central bank can be misled by relying 
on a new neoclassical synthesis (NNS) model without money and banking when managing its 
interbank-rate policy instrument.   
  We begin by illustrating the presence of the two effects or mechanisms—the accelerator and 
                                                 
2 Different financial assets play an important role in the model’s transmission process, in a manner that is somewhat 
reminiscent of monetarist views summarized by Meltzer (1995).   5
the attenuator—by which money and banking influence the model economy’s dynamics.
3  Next, we 
illustrate the extent to which a central bank could misjudge its interbank rate response to a goods 
productivity shock by not taking money and banking into account.  Finally, we consider shocks 
emanating from the banking sector itself—a shock to loan monitoring productivity and a shock to 
effective collateral that is meant to represent widespread financial distress.   
  The paper’s outline is as follows.  In Section 2, we begin by building upon the specification 
of the Goodfriend (2005) model and highlighting some of its features.  Next, in Section 3 we 
emphasize the various interest rates that appear in the model and the frictions that make them differ 
from each other.  Then in Sections 4, 5, and 6 we develop the steady state solution that forms the 
basis for the linearized version of the model, which will be used in subsequent analysis, and discuss 
the steady state calibration and some of the quantitative consequences of incorporating money and 
banking.  In Section 7 we complete the specification and linearization of our dynamic model.  
Finally, in Section 8 we conduct various policy experiments to see how this model performs in 
comparison to more standard specifications without any banking sector.  Conclusions are briefly 
outlined in Section 9.  
2. Core Model Outline 
  The model that we will use to investigate these issues regarding the role of money and 
banking needs to be specified at the level of preferences and technology, so as to be potentially 
structural and invariant to policy specification.  In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, 
we have specified the model in terms of an optimizing problem for a typical household, which not 
only consumes a bundle of differentiated commodities, supplies labor, and saves but also produces 
for sale a differentiated good and in addition operates a (competitive) banking firm.  Thus the basic 
                                                 
3 In discussions of the monetary transmission process, it is common to find references to various transmission 
“channels,” and we are tempted to utilize this terminology.  In general equilibrium analysis, however, the concept of a 
transmission channel is usually ambiguous, since the behavior of all variables is interrelated and a change in a single 
parameter may affect several marginal conditions.  Consequently, we have made an effort to resist this temptation.     6
optimizing analysis is conducted in one step.  It will take a bit of discussion, nevertheless, to 
describe the details of the typical household’s decision problem.  When that task is completed, we 
will specify that there are many households and aggregate by assuming that they are all similar and 
finding a symmetric equilibrium. 
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where ct is consumption during period t of Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundles and 
ss
tt (1 n m ) −− is 
leisure in t, with 
s
t n  representing labor supplied to the production of goods (in the household firm or 
elsewhere) and 
s
t m  is labor likewise supplied to banking activities (to be described below).  In the 
household’s budget constraint, we must recognize that the household pays for its consumption 
expenditures with income from its production and sale of goods, net receipts from supplying labor, 
net sales of its financial assets,
4 and net sales of capital goods.  (For simplicity, we are going to keep 
the aggregate stock of capital on a deterministic steady growth path—with a steady-state magnitude 
that is determined endogenously—but individual households can buy or sell capital goods so their 
market price is a variable.)  The household has market power in the product that it supplies, with θ 
being its elasticity of demand, stemming from a value of θ for the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption in the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator setup.  Consequently, the household maximizes 
(1) subject to two constraints.  The first is the budget constraint 
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4 Its financial assets are high-powered money and one-period government bonds.  Note that asset-liability positions 
between households and banks are netted out, a step that requires that banking firms possess no monopoly power.   7
and the second is the sales equals net production constraint needed to reflect monopolistic 
competition in the supply of the household’s own produced good, namely, 
(3) 
1A A
t t t ttt K( A 1 n) c( P/ P) 0
η− η − θ −= . 
Here the variables are as follows: qt = real price of capital,
5 Kt = quantity of capital at start of t, Bt+1 
= nominal bonds held at end of t, Pt = price of household’s produced good in t, 
A
t P  = consumption 
goods price index, nt = labor demanded by household as producer, mt = labor demanded by 
household’s banking operation, wt = real wage rate, Ht = nominal holdings of base money held at 
the end of t, taxt = real lump-sum tax payments in t, and 
B
t R = nominal interest rate on government 
bonds purchased in t and redeemed in t+1.  The Lagrangian multiplier on (2) is denoted λt and for 
(3) it is ξt, with β
t inserted (in both cases) in the Lagrangian expression for each period to make the 
multipliers represent values as of the indicated period t, not the startup date 0.  In (3), A1t is a shock 
to productivity in goods production, similar to a standard technology shock in the real-business-
cycle literature, whose mean increases over time at the trend growth rate γ.  The superscript A on 
any variable, it might be noted, indicates that the variable is an economy-wide measure that each 
individual household takes as given.   
  In addition, the model includes one more constraint, which will build in most of our money-
and-banking content.  Since we require that the model must pertain to a monetary economy, we 
need to incorporate the transaction-facilitating properties of money—the medium of exchange—in 
some explicit manner.
6  The most concrete way possible is via a constraint requiring the household 
to pay for consumption spending during period t with money held in that period.  Our specification 
will have the medium of exchange composed entirely of bank deposits, and will require that 
                                                 
5 The relative price in terms of consumption goods. 
6 In the present version of our model, we do not distinguish between transaction balances and time deposits at banks.  
Medium of exchange money is implicitly central to our analysis because it is by managing the aggregate quantity of 
reserves, which banks hold to facilitate transactions, that monetary policy affects interest rates.   8
consumption during t must be rigidly related to deposits held at the end of t.  We assume that this 
constraint always binds, and as a consequence will require below that ct = V
A
tt D /P , where Dt is 
nominal deposits and V is the constant that reflects the assumed rigidity.
7   
  In this context, we come to the banking sector.  We write the simplest possible bank balance 
sheet, namely,  
(4) Ht + Lt = Dt,  
where H, L, and D are high-powered (base) money, loans to households, and deposits, respectively, 
for the typical bank.
8  Our transaction constraint is 







which, together with (4), implicitly represents a derived demand for high-powered (base) money.  
For reference below, we let rr be the bank’s chosen ratio of Ht (which equals bank reserves at the 
central bank) to deposits, so from the balance sheet we have rrDt + Lt = Dt or Dt = Lt/(1 − rr).  
  Finally, the analytical heart of the banking sector specification is a model of loan 
“production” or, more accurately, loan management.  This crucial activity is conducted, we assume, 
by a combination of collateral and loan monitoring, the latter activity being performed by workers 
whose labor is supplied by households to the banking sector, as mentioned above.  Specifically, we 
posit the following production function pertaining to the management of loans:  
(6) 
A1
t t t1 t t t1 t t L/ P F ( b A 3k qK )( A 2m)
α −α
++ =+                            0 < α < 1. 
Here we have a Cobb-Douglas production function with factor inputs being labor mt (for 
                                                 
7 This is not our favorite specification; we plan to loosen it in subsequent work.  Given, however, that we are using this 
constraint—similar in spirit to a “cash in advance” constraint—it is necessary to incorporate some factor such as V to 
take account of the fact that the velocity of aggregate bank deposits is far less than 1.0 for quarterly time periods. We 
follow the usual convention of calibrating the model so that time periods represent quarters.   
8 Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) offer a microeconomic explanation of the synergy between deposit and loan 
provision in banking.    9
“monitoring”) and collateral  t1 t t t1 b A3 kq K ++ + , with bt+1 =
AB
t1 t t B/ P ( 1 R ) + + .
9  In the latter 
expression the effective amount of collateral possessed by a typical household depends upon, 
among other things, the price of capital goods, qt.  The constant k, 0 < k < 1, reflects the inferiority 
of capital to bonds for collateral purposes, resulting because capital goods (unlike bonds) typically 
require substantial monitoring to verify their physical condition and market value.  The variables 
A2t and A3t are shock terms, reflecting stochastic technology effects, analogous to A1t in the goods 
production function included in (3).  Here A2t, like A1t, has a trend growth rate of γ whereas A3t is 
trendless.  
  With the model as specified, we derive first-order optimality conditions pertaining to the 
choice variables m
s, m, n
s, n, K, P, and B,
10 and also define the variable
11  
(7)  t t t1 t t t1 c/ ( b A 3k qK ) . ++ Ω= α +    
Then imposing symmetry and market clearing, and also constant aggregate capital, we obtain the 
following conditions for equilibrium: 
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9 Banks expend effort and require borrowers to post collateral, but in equilibrium there is no default.  This modeling 
choice is based, in part, on progress that has been made in understanding the implications of credit market imperfections 
in limited commitment environments where there is no equilibrium default, such as Kocherlakota (1996). 
10 The system has some recursivity such that ct and Ht can be solved for after the other variables. 










   λ φ
−Ω − + β + =    λλ   
  
 (13)  ξt/λt = (θ−1)/θ 
 (14)  bt+1 =
AB
t1 t t B/ P ( 1 R ) + + .   
(15) gt − taxt =  A
tt H/ P −  A
t1 t H/ P −  + Bt+1/
BA
t1 t (1 R )P + +  − Bt/
A
t P    
Here (15) is the government (including central bank) budget constraint.  In a symmetric, flexible-
price equilibrium, equations (2)-(15) serve to determine values of the fourteen endogenous variables 
c, n, m, w, q, P, λ, ξ, L, D, Ω, B, tax, and R
B given exogenous shock processes and policy-set time 
paths for H, g, and b.
12  Alternatively, and more realistically, we will also study equilibria in which 
the central bank sets values of an overnight interest rate, rather than Ht.  In the foregoing list of 
variables, we have not included the capital stock, K, because our equilibria are defined with Kt 
equal to its steady-state value in each period.  The steady-state value of K is, nevertheless, 
determined endogenously.    
  In our experiments involving dynamic adjustments we will utilize a sticky-price version of 
the model by eliminating the labor demand equation (10) and replacing it with a standard Calvo 
price adjustment relation, in a manner that will be described below in Section 5. 
3. Interest Rates 
  Now we turn our attention to the various interest rates mentioned in the introduction.  With 
the exception of the bond rate for loans to the government, these did not appear in the analysis of 
Section 2 because of our expositional strategy of treating goods producers and banks as owned and 
operated by households.  Here we introduce a one-period default-free security that provides no 
collateral services to its holder and accordingly bears a shadow “total” return that represents a 
purely intertemporal rate of interest that the sum of risk-adjusted pecuniary and service yields on 
                                                 
12 For simplicity, we keep government spending gt equal to zero throughout.   11
other assets must match.   We denote the nominal rate on this fictitious security as Rt
T, as in 
Goodfriend (2005), and will use it as a “benchmark” rate in what follows.  From the specification of 
the household optimization problem above, it can be seen that 
T
t R must satisfy the familiar condition 














How does this rate relate to the bond rate that appeared above, 
B
t R ?  By comparison with first-order 
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Thus these two rates coincide only if Ωt = 0 and/or φ/ctλt − 1 = 0.  The former condition makes good 
intuitive sense, as   Ωt ≥ 0 can be viewed as the partial derivative of the constraint (5) with respect 
to collateral, so the rates can differ only if collateral services are valued at the margin.  But with our 
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 will be positive in all periods.  
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 as the liquidity service yield on bonds, which we denote as 
LSYt
B.  From (17), then, we have the approximate equality 
(18) 
TB B
tt t RRL S Y −= . 
  In our model’s non-stochastic steady state, bonds and capital will have the same risk 
properties, but capital will serve as collateral less well than bills, by the factor k.  Accordingly, one 
might guess that the liquidity service yield on capital, 
K
t LSY , would satisfy the approximation 
(19) 
KB
tt LSY k LSY =× .   12
In fact, that result can be verified by a more complex calculation analogous to the one for bonds.
13 
  A crucial interest rate for monetary policy analysis is the interbank rate, denoted 
IB
t R .  Since 
such a rate serves as the policy rate for the Federal Reserve and many other central banks, 
IB
t R will 
be viewed as the policy instrument in some of our experiments in Section 8.  How, then, is the 
interbank rate 
IB
t R related to other rates?  The basic fact is that, in our model, a bank can obtain 
funds from the interbank market at the rate 
IB
t R and could loan them to households, if it incurred all 
the necessary costs, at the benchmark rate
T
t R .  This reflects a no-arbitrage condition between the 
loan market and the asset market. Then what are these costs?  We have postulated above that loan 
production requires monitoring costs and collateral costs as specified in equation (6).  Here we 
temporarily adopt the fiction that the collateral costs are borne by the bank, i.e., we consider 
uncollateralized loans. At the cost-minimizing optimum mix of factor inputs, the real marginal cost 
of loan production equals the factor price divided by that factor’s marginal product for each factor 
of production.  Thus we can find this marginal cost as the real wage divided by the partial derivative 
of Lt/Pt with respect to mt, where the latter is employment of labor services (for monitoring) by the 
typical bank.  From (6) we find this partial derivative to be (1 − α)(Lt/Pt)/mt so using expression (4) 
we obtain Vmtwt/(1−α)(1−rr)ct as the real marginal cost of loan management.  Profit maximization 
by banks implies, then, that 









+  −α − 
 = (1 +
T
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which can be approximated as 
(21) 
T
t R  − 
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13 This result, and the one in the previous paragraph, is more fully developed in Goodfriend (2005).   13
  Now, although we can imagine uncollateralized loans to households at the “total” asset 
market rate 
T
t R , actual loans are collateralized in equilibrium.  Accordingly, since (1 − α) is the 
factor share for monitoring, the marginal cost of loan production is multiplied by (1 − α) and the 
relevant relationship becomes 









+  − 
 = (1 +
L
t R ),   
where 
L
t R  is the interest rate on collateralized loans.  As before, the corresponding approximation is 
(23) 
L
t R  − 
IB








  Finally, in our setup, banks are paying households a rate 
D
t R  on their deposits.  Given 
competitive conditions, this rate differs from the interbank rate only because the fraction 1−rr of 
non-interest bearing deposits are not loaned, implying that 
(24) 
D
t R  = 
IB
t R (1−rr).    
  Given this plethora of interest rates and rate differentials, which differential is it that 
measures the “external finance premium” in the context of our model?  We identify the external 
finance premium with the real marginal cost of loan production, since our loan production costs 
reflect the cost of external finance emphasized by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), among 
others. Household borrowers pay a loan rate that covers real marginal cost in addition to the 
interbank rate, which equals the deposit rate except for a small discrepancy due to a non-zero (but 
low) reserve ratio. Hence, the real marginal cost of loan production is an external finance premium 
from the household’s perspective.    
  It is useful to distinguish between an uncollateralized and a collateralized external finance 
premium in our model. The external finance premium on an uncollateralized loan (UEFP) would be    14
T
t R  − 
IB
t R because this interest rate spread reflects the full real marginal cost of loan production.  In 
effect, the uncollateralized loan rate is equated to 
T
t R .  
  On the other hand, the spread between the collateralized loan rate and the interbank rate is 
L
t R  − 
IB
t R=  ( 1  − α)(
T
t R  − 
IB
t R ) because the smaller 
L
t R  − 
IB
t R interest rate spread need only cover 
the portion of real marginal loan cost due to the monitoring effort required when the borrower puts 
up the requisite collateral.  In effect, households that borrow on a collateralized basis receive a 
deduction on the loan rate equal to the share α of collateral in loan costs. For calibration, we 
identify the collateralized external finance premium, which we denote as CEFP, with the spread 
between the prime rate and the interbank rate. 
  Because the banking sector is perfectly competitive and loan production features constant 
returns to scale, net interest income (
T
t R  − 
IB
t R)  L t/Pt  equals the sum of payments to the factor 
inputs in loan production, mtwt  + bt+1 LSYt
B  + qt(Kt+1) LSYt
K.  The zero profit condition indicates 
that the liquidity service yields on bonds and capital can be interpreted as “rent” paid to borrowers 
for the collateral services that their assets provide in loan production.  Bonds and capital earn  lower 
pecuniary returns than Rt
T, the benchmark on a fictitious bond that provides no collateral services, 
by amounts equal to the “rent” that bonds and capital earn as deductions on borrowing costs.  
Drawing upon equations (19), (18), (9), and (23) above, it can be shown by succesive substitution 
that the external finance premium and the liquidity service yields on bonds and capital are related to 
each other as LSYt
K = k×LSYt
B 
 = k Ωt [(1−rr)/V(1 − α)] CEFPt. 
 4. Steady State Solution 
  The next step is to present the deterministic, zero-inflation, steady-state version of the model 
in Section 2 as a basis for calibration and our first batch of analytical exercises.
14  Preliminary 
                                                 
14 Henceforth, we will just say “steady state” rather than “deterministic, zero-inflation, steady state.”   15
consideration of the steady-state system indicated that the inclusion of output growth would be 
essential to any degree whatsoever of realism.  Accordingly, we assume that the shock terms A1t 
and A2t in the production functions for goods and loans each trend upward at the growth rate γ.  
Therefore, deterministic expressions for these two variables can be written as A1t = A10(1 + γ)
t and 
A2t = A20(1 + γ)
t.  For simplicity we normalize by setting A10 = A20 = 1.  For a steady state, then, λt 
must shrink at the rate γ.  Next we note that the relative price of capital will, in the steady state, 
equal 1, so that detrended average per-household capital Kt is an endogenous constant, K. 
Consequently, by substituting out certain variables we can express the core steady-state system in 
terms of seven equations involving only the seven variables c, m, n, w, λ, Ω, and K.
15 Here c, w, λ, 
and K are constant detrended values of the variables written above, which grow (or shrink) at the 
rate γ, while the others are constant without any detrending. We will include q in the expressions to 
reveal its importance in the system, but the reader should keep in mind that q = 1 in the steady state 
and that k is a parameter.  As a piece of notation, we use boc to denote the constant steady-state 
value of bonds to consumption and assume that the fiscal authority behaves so as to stabilize boc at 
an exogenous, policy-determined value.  
  The first step is to substitute (6) into (5) and write the result as 
(25) 1  = 
1 VF kqK m
boc
(1 rr) c c
α− α
   +    −   
. 
Then equations (7) – (11) above can be represented as follows: 













                                                 
15 In addition, the variable r, which denotes the before-depreciation marginal product of capital, could be obtained 
recursively after the other seven variables are determined from r − δ = (η(θ−1)/θ)(n/K)
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Finally, we also have one relation that amounts to the overall resource constraint that incorporates 
equations (2), (3), and (15); it is as follows: 
(31) 
1 1 (K/c) (n/c) K/c
η− η =− δ . 
Thus we have (25)-(31) as the seven equations that determine the steady-state values of c, m, n, 
w, λ, Ω, and K, these being the only relevant variables since boc and q are exogenous. 
  Given these core-model variables, and a given steady-state inflation rate, one can then 





D using equations (16), (17), (21), 
(23), and (24).  Accordingly, we now turn to our calibration.  
5. Calibration 
  One leading objective in the paper is to explore the quantitative consequences of money and 
banking for interest rates and monetary policy in an otherwise conventional benchmark NNS model.  
Because the model in this paper is not as flexibly specified as we would like, our aims are fairly 
modest.  First, we want to determine whether a steady-state calibration exists that fits the relevant 
observed variables tolerably well. Second, we want to explore under this calibration how much 
money and banking matters quantitatively for the various interest rates and the model’s other 
endogenous macroeconomic variables. 
  The model has twelve parameters that need to be specified.  Six of the parameters appear in 
the benchmark model without money and banking. For these we follow convention. First, we   17
calibrate φ = 0.4 to yield roughly 1/3 of available time working in either goods production or 
banking. Second, we choose η = 0.36 to reflect relative shares of capital and labor in goods 
production. Third, we choose θ to yield a markup of 1.1. Fourth, we choose a conventional 
(quarterly) value of β = 0.99. Fifth, we set the quarterly depreciation rate δ = 0.025. Sixth, we set γ 
= 0.0050 to correspond to 2% productivity growth per year. 
  We calibrate the fiscal policy parameter boc by using values of U.S. public debt held 
domestically by private entities, relative to GDP, as of the third quarter of 2005.  The resulting 
figure is boc = 0.56.  
  That leaves five parameters relating to money and banking. First, we calibrate velocity as 
the ratio of U.S. GDP to M3 for the fourth quarter of 2005, implying that V = 0.31. Second, we set 
the reserve ratio at rr = 0.005, measured as the ratio of U.S. total bank reserves to M3 as of 
December 2005.  Finally, we calibrate the remaining three banking parameters α, k, and F jointly to 
match, as best as we can, the following conditions: (i) a 1% per year average short-term real 
“riskless rate” that is typical in the finance literature, e.g. Campbell (1999, p. 1233), (ii) a 2% 
average collateralized external finance premium that is in line with the average spread of the prime 
rate over the federal funds rate in the postwar United States, and (iii) a share of total U.S. 
employment in depository credit intermediation as of August 2005 of 1.6% as reported by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Accordingly, the three remaining parameters are calibrated as  α = 0.65, 
F = 9.0, and k = 0.2.  The relatively low productivity of capital implied by the latter is consistent 
with the fact that banks specialize in information-intensive lending, as opposed to (e.g.) mortgage or 
auto lending in which collateral is more productive in defraying monitoring costs. 
  Our model of money, banking, and interest rate spreads is constructed on what we regard as 
a sensible theoretical foundation. It was at the start of the exercise not at all obvious that banking 
parameters in the context of the macro model could be found that would achieve a reasonable   18
calibration.  Nevertheless, we shall see below that the calibration works tolerably well and in our 
view does provide a basis for judging the quantitative importance of money and banking in the 
steady state and in the dynamic analysis of monetary policy.  
6. Steady-State Analysis 
  We begin the analysis of the steady state below by describing how well the benchmark 
calibration given in Section 5 is able to match the endogenous interest rates and aggregates to the 
respective observables. Then we illuminate the quantitative consequences of money and banking for 
the steady state in two ways.
16 First, we compute a counterfactual calibration by presuming that the 
banking sector is 10 times as efficient in loan production as in the benchmark calibration. We 
compare “highly efficient banking” and benchmark calibrations to show how much money and 
banking matters quantitatively. Second, we perform two experiments based on the benchmark 
calibration to illustrate the model’s sensitivity to the debt to GDP ratio
17 and the velocity of 
aggregate bank deposits.  
  The steady-state values of the endogenous variables for the benchmark calibration are 
reported in the top panel of Table 1. Starting with the labor market variables, we see that total 
available working time is close to 1/3 as desired. Moreover, the ratio of time worked in banking to 
total work effort, m/(n+m), is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, not far from the 1.6% ratio in 
the U.S. economy. The steady-state capital/output ratio is 2.7 annualized, which is also in an 
acceptable range. 
  Turning to the interest rates, note that the steady state is computed at zero inflation so that 
we can interpret all the interest rates as “real” rates.  To start, note that the rate of interest R
T on the 
benchmark fictitious security that provides no collateral services is exactly 6% per annum. This 
follows directly from the calibrated values of β and γ, together with log utility, which imply that R
T 
                                                 
16 Linguistically, we refer to “money and banking” in the singular, since it is the combination that is of importance. 
17 Our model does not feature Ricardian equivalence because of the collateral services provided by bonds.   19
= ρ + γ, where β = 1/(1+ ρ). Strictly speaking, the interbank rate R
IB and the government bond rate 
R
B are both short-term interest rates in the model, so they should both be near the 1% per annum 
(p.a.) average short-term rate. The calibration puts the interbank rate at 0.84% p.a., which is 
satisfactorily close to 1%. However, the government bond rate is 2.1% per year under the 
calibration, which is less satisfactory.  That said, the two rates do straddle the 1% p.a. average short-
term rate, and neither is too far from 1%.  In addition, it is noteworthy that the average maturity of 
the stock of public debt outstanding used to calibrate the model is around 5 years. On this basis one 
might presume that R
B under the calibration is more representative of a 5-year bond rate than the 
short-term T-bill rate. Thus it is interesting to note that Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, p. 
415) report an average 5-year term premium of around 1.2% p.a. relative to the short rate, which 
happens to match closely the spread between R
B and R
IB in our calibrated steady state.  Such 
evidence provides a plausible reason why R
B is elevated under our calibration, and suggests that it 
would be useful to modify the model to distinguish various maturities of government bonds 
outstanding in order to improve the calibration.  Finally, the 2% p.a. collateralized external finance 
premium under the calibration lines up very well with the average spread between the prime rate 
and the interbank rate.  This agreement reflects one aspect of our strategy of choosing banking 
parameters so as to approximate the three conditions mentioned above.  
  In order to illuminate the extent to which money and banking matters quantitatively, for 
steady-state interest rates and macroeconomic aggregates, consider a counterfactual calibration in 
which loan production is 10 times as efficient as in the benchmark calibration, implying that 
banking services are much less costly to produce. Specifically, let F = 90.  The endogenous steady-
state variables produced by this counterfactual calibration are shown in the bottom panel of Table 1, 
labeled “highly efficient banking.”  The striking feature of the resulting steady state is that all the 
interest rates converge to R
T, while the external finance premium and work in banking shrink so   20
much as to be reported as approximately zero—zero to four decimal places.  
  Interpreting this counterfactual as a steady state in which banking services are almost free, 
we can compare it to the benchmark steady state in order to determine how much money and 
banking matters quantitatively for the endogenous variables. By this comparison, money and 
banking appears to matter very much in a number of ways. Costly money and banking pushes short-
term interest rates, R
B and R
IB, lower by about 4 and 5 percentage points p.a., respectively, than they 
would be otherwise in the steady state.
18  Money and banking does this by creating a return to 
collateral and a consequent liquidity-service yield that pushes R
B far below R
T, and by making 
external finance costly in terms of work effort thereby forcing R
IB far below R
T.  Specifically, under 
the benchmark calibration, the presence of costly money and banking creates a LSY
B of 4% per 
annum and a real marginal cost of uncollateralized loan production of 5% per annum.  Note also, 





IB) = 1 − α = 0.35. 
  Money and banking has significant quantitative consequences for nonfinancial macro-
economic aggregates, too. Thus the steady-state capital stock is 5.7% higher in the benchmark 
calibration than in the counterfactual “highly efficient banking” steady state.
19  The reason is as 
follows. The return R
T on the fictitious security that yields no collateral services is invariant to the 
efficiency of the banking system. Hence, the total net return to capital, which (abstracting from 
differential riskiness) must equal R
T, is invariant across steady states. At the benchmark calibration 
LSY
K = kLSY
B = 0.2(0.04) = 0.008, so the marginal product of capital net of depreciation must be 
0.8 percentage points p.a. lower, thereby requiring a higher K/n ratio.  The K/n ratios are 28.7 and 
                                                 
18 From the perspective of our paper, we would say that the low risk-free rate in Huggett (1993) is due to an implicit 
broad liquidity services yield on the risk-free asset in his model.  
19 The extra accumulation of capital in our model is related to that in Aiyagari (1994).  We would say that the steady-
state spread between the rate of time preference and the marginal product of capital in Aiyagari’s model represents an 
implicit broad liquidity services yield on capital.    21
26.5 in the benchmark and highly efficient banking steady states, respectively.  The capital stock, K, 
is 5.7% higher in the benchmark calibration in spite of the fact that work in goods production, n, is 
2.5% lower.  The net result is that consumption, c, is about 1% lower due to costly money and 
banking, and total work m + n is about 0.5% lower.  
  Why exactly does money and banking push the interbank rate R
IB down so far, according to 
the benchmark calibration? The reason is that households have an inelastic demand for aggregate 
bank deposits in the model which must be funded by borrowing from banks. A no-arbitrage 
condition keeps the uncollateralized loan rate equal to R
T. Banks must cover the marginal cost of 
loan production to willingly accommodate the demand for loans needed to fund the desired 
deposits. At a zero net interest margin, R
IB = R
T, a bank would rather lend funds in the interbank 
market (where the marginal lending cost is zero). An excess supply of interbank credit pushes R
IB 
down to the point where the net interest margin just covers the real marginal cost of loan 
production. At that point the interbank credit market, the loan market, and the deposit market all 
clear.    
  The steady-state implications of money and banking in the benchmark calibration can be 
appreciated from the perspective of financial economics with reference to the “equity premium 
puzzle,” which asks why real stock returns average 6 percentage points per annum above real short-
term interest rates, such as the federal funds rate or the 3-month T-bill rate.
20  We have seen above 
that the inclusion of money and banking implies a liquidity services yield that pushes R
B below R
T 
by about 4 percentage points p.a., and competitive banks that push R
IB more than
 5 percentage 
points below R
T.  However, according to the benchmark calibration the liquidity services yield on 
capital only pushes the net marginal product of capital 0.8 percentage points p.a. below R
T in the 
steady state.  Thus, according to the benchmark calibration, money and banking push real interest 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Campbell (1999, p. 1234).   22
rates down relative to the return to capital, which we identify with equity, by a net of 4.2 percentage 
points for R
IB and 3.2 percentage points for R
B.  Thus, it would appear that considerations of the 
kind related to money and banking identified in our model make a quantitatively significant 
contribution to resolving the equity premium puzzle.
21   
  Before moving on to Sections 7 and 8, where we discuss the implications of money and 
banking for monetary policy more comprehensively, we consider the consequences of money and 
banking for the “real neutral interbank interest rate” from a steady-state perspective. In monetary 
policy practice, the neutral interbank rate is the level of the interbank rate thought to be consistent 
with full employment, with the economy growing at trend, and with the price level stabilized on a 
path consistent with the central bank’s inflation target. Within our model, the neutral interbank rate 
accordingly has a natural interpretation as the real interbank rate in the steady state.  Here we 
describe the sensitivity of the steady-state interbank rate to the ratio of government bonds to GDP 
and to the velocity of aggregate bank deposits, to indicate the magnitude of variations that a central 
bank should expect in the neutral interbank rate, according to our model, in economies in which 
costly money and banking is a reality.   
  We find, first, that a ratio of government bonds to GDP (boc) 50% higher than in the 
benchmark calibration raises R
IB by 0.9 percentage points p.a., and a boc ratio 50% lower reduces 
R
IB by 1.2 percentage points p.a.
22 These R
IB changes reflect changes in the real marginal cost of 
loan production associated with the effect of different values of boc on the weighted value of 
collateral in the economy. Second, we find that velocity (V) 10% higher than in the benchmark 
calibration increases R
IB by 0.8 percentage points p.a. and velocity 10% lower reduces R
IB by 1 
percentage point p.a.  The interbank rate is sensitive to V because velocity governs the demand for 
                                                 
21 See Bansal and Coleman (1996) for an asset-pricing model that distinguishes between explicit pecuniary and implicit 
service yields in a study of the equity premium, but in a manner quite different than ours. 
22 We interpret this experiment as if the steady-state rate of inflation is high enough to keep R
IB above the zero bound.    23
bank deposits and the induced demand for bank loans to fund deposits.  
7. Linearization 
  We now move on to the dynamic issues mentioned in the introduction.  In that regard we 
need to complete the specification of our dynamic model, linearize it in a suitable manner, and 
calibrate the new components.  The first step is to recognize the presence, irrelevant in steady-state 
analysis, of sluggish price adjustments.  For that purpose we adopt the most nearly standard of all 
price-adjustment formulations, the discrete-time version of the Calvo (1983) mechanism.  We 
recognize that there are grounds for objection to this specification, but as our model is strongly 
unorthodox in other ways, we consider it best to stay close to the mainstream with this component.  
Accordingly, we adopt the following price adjustment equation, applicable at the household level 
and also to the general price level for goods in a symmetric equilibrium: 
(32)  ∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 + κmct + ut                                                             κ > 0. 
Here pt = log Pt = log 
A
t P s o  ∆pt represents the inflation rate, while mct is the real marginal cost of 
goods production.  With sticky prices, relation (13) above is replaced by 
(33) mct = ξt/λt,  
so marginal cost is not constant in this case.  We have added two equations and only one variable 
(not counting pt or its defining equation) so some relationship from Section 2 has to be eliminated.  
It is, naturally, the labor demand function (10), which represents behavior under full price 
flexibility.  In the numerical results below, we set κ = 0.05, intended to represent a typical value in 
the recent literature.  
  The other major addition to the model of Section 2 is a specification of monetary policy 
behavior by the central bank.  In the policy experiments below we will use two alternative types of 
policy rules.  The first is a rule for setting the interbank interest rate, Rt
IB.  Specifically, we adopt a 
rule of the general type made famous by Taylor (1993), allowing (as in most recent work) inclusion   24
of a lagged value of Rt
IB to reflect the prevalence of interest-rate smoothing by many central banks: 
(34) 
IB IB
t3 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 1 t R( 1) [( 1) p m c ]Re − =− µµ ++ µ ∆+ µ + µ +. 
Here we have written the rule in a fashion that implicitly sets the central bank’s target inflation rate, 
say π*, equal to zero.  With a Cobb-Douglas production function, mct serves as a measure of the 
output gap used by Taylor (1993). 
  While (34) expresses monetary policy behavior in a rather realistic way, it will be useful for 
diagnostic purposes also to consider some policy experiments based on an alternative type of rule 
that depicts the central bank as controlling the growth rate of the stock of high-powered (base) 
money, Ht.  Specifically, we will also report results based on the following monetary policy rule, in 
which ht = log Ht and t h ∆ is the growth rate of Ht: 
(34’) 
HH
tt 1 t hh e − ∆= ρ ∆ +. 
Here and in what follows, we use symbols with a “hat” to represent fractional deviations from 
steady-state values.  Also, in (34’) we have 
H 01 < ρ<  while 
H
t e  represents the random, 
unsystematic component of policy behavior. In our model,  t ˆ H  is related to consumption and the 
price level by equations (4) and (5); the implied linearized relationship is  
(35)  ttt ˆˆ ˆ HcP =+. 
  Equations (32), (33), (34) [or (34’)], and (35) are combined with linearized versions of 
equations (4)-(15).  Because we are using a symmetric equilibrium condition, the number of 
equations needed is smaller than in Section 2.  Essential relationships are as follows:
23 
(36)  tt t t
nm ˆ ˆˆ ˆ wnm
1nm 1nm
  λ+ = +   −− −−  
 
                                                 
23 Here ait denotes the fractional deviation from trend for Ait, i = 1, 2, 3.   25
(37)  tt t t
c(1 ) c(1 ) ˆ ˆˆ ˆ wm c 1 0
mw mw
−α −α    ++ + + λ =   
  
 
(38)  tt t tt
kK/c b ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (c q a3 ) b
b (kK/c) b (kK/c)
 
Ω= − − −   ++  
, with b = B/(P(1+R
B)c) 
(39)  tt t t
KK ˆˆ ˆ c1 ( 1 ) ( n a 1 ) q
cc
δδ    =+ − η + −   
  
 
(40)  tt t t t t t
bc kK(1 ) ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ c( 1 ) ( a 2m ) ( bc ) ( a 3q )
bc kK(1 ) bc kK(1 )
  αα + γ
=− α + + + + +   ++ γ ++ γ  
 
(41)  tt t t ˆˆ ˆ ˆ mc n w c =+−  




Ωφ  =  λ 
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φ φ  β β    Ω − Ω + +Ω −− + − δ + η λ+ − δ     λ λ +γ +γ   
()
1 1
tt 1 t 1t 1 t




   βη Ωφ β
++ − η + − + − δ + η λ    +γ λ +γ   
 
The last of these, which is the linearized version of the first order condition with respect to the 
capital stock, is obviously a complex condition.  Be that as it may, inspection of equations (32), 
(33), and (35)-(43) shows that the endogenous variables that appear in this system are 
tt t t t t t t t t t ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ p , mc , Ω , λ , ξ , w , n , m , c , q , and P. ∆   Thus, with policy determination of the paths of  
tt ˆ ˆ H a n d  bwe have the proper number of relationships for this essential set of variables.
24  Once 
their solutions are found, it is tedious but conceptually straightforward to calculate the interest rates 
TBI B L
ttt t R ,R ,R , and R  using linearized versions of the relationships (16), (17), (21), and (22) given in 
Section 3.  
                                                 
24 Of course, the dynamic solution requires proper attention to transversality conditions, etc.  In all the results reported 
below, the utilized solution is the only stable solution.    26
8. Dynamic Analysis 
  Here we study dynamics using the linearized model calibrated at the steady state, as 
amended in Section 7 to include Calvo-style staggered pricing and a policy rule, to explore how 
much costly money and banking matters quantitatively for an otherwise standard NNS model of 
monetary policy.  In our exercises, the dynamic consequences of money and banking for monetary 
policy are illustrated in two ways. First, we demonstrate the presence of two conflicting effects by 
which money and banking affect the transmission of monetary policy. We identify a banking 
“attenuator” effect that tends to blunt the impact of monetary policy actions. However, there is also 
a banking “accelerator” in the model, resembling the familiar financial accelerator, with the 
potential to amplify theimpact of monetary policy actions. We discuss the mechanics and 
implications of the two potentially conflicting aspects of monetary transmission for the behavior of 
the economy and the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
  Second, we illustrate how much a central bank could be misled quantitatively in its 
interbank-rate policy actions by ignoring money and banking altogether. To this end, we investigate 
the extent to which a central bank could misjudge its interest rate policy response to a generic goods 
productivity shock by not taking into account the existence of money and banking. Then we 
consider two shocks emanating from the banking sector itself (which have no counterpart in the 
benchmark NNS model): a shock to loan monitoring productivity and a shock to effective collateral.  
The latter is meant to capture the effects of widespread financial distress. 
  The banking attenuator and accelerator effects are highlighted, respectively, in Figures 1 and 
2. Each figure reports impulse responses of key endogenous variables to a 1 percentage point shock 
to policy rule (34’) assumed to generate the growth of high-powered money. The experiments 
depicted in the two figures differ only in the assumed autoregressive (AR) coefficient of the money 
growth rule. Specifically, Figure 1 reports outcomes for a modest degree of money growth   27
persistence, with AR coefficient 
H ρ  = 0.6, whereas money growth in Figure 2 is highly persistent 
with 
H ρ  = 0.99.    
  In Figure 1, the modest degree of money growth persistence stimulates a 0.6 percentage 
point increase in consumption on impact that dies away relatively quickly as firms adjust prices to 
neutralize the cumulative money growth effect on the markup and, thereby, on other real variables.  
The aggregate demand stimulated by expansionary monetary policy is accommodated by an 
expansion of hours worked in goods production and an elevated real wage. There is also a relatively 
large increase in the real price of capital, q, due to the depressed capital-labor ratio and the elevated 
marginal product of capital.   
  The banking attenuator is evident in Figure 1 in the following sense.  According to the broad 
liquidity constraint (25), the increase in consumption generates a proportionate increase in the 
demand for bank deposits that must be accommodated by a commensurate increase in loan 
production. The increase in the value of the capital stock associated with the rise in q provides 
additional collateral value that helps produce more loans. However, as revealed by the simulation, 
the banking system also expands loan production effort, m, to accommodate the increased demand 
for deposits and loans.   
  Figure 1 shows that the net effect, summarized in (21) and (23), of m, w, and c is to raise the 
external finance premium EFP temporarily by around 0.8 percentage points.  The plot in Figure 1 
pertains to both collateralized and uncollateralized versions of the EFP because linearized versions 
of both (21) and (23) give EFPt =  tt t ˆˆ ˆ mwc + − with hatted values being fractional deviations from 
steady state.  We see that R
IB initially rises but by less than R
T so the R
T− R
IB interest rate spread 
rises at its peak by 0.8 percentage points. Both nominal interest rates rise initially, reflecting 
inflation expectations, but R
IB by less.  R
T first rises and then falls relative to expected inflation due   28
to movements in the pure real rate of interest associated with the expected change in λ according  
to (16).  Consequently, R
IB itself falls after one period by about 0.6 percentage points on net.
25   
  In this case the external finance premium is procyclical—it rises in response to an 
expansionary monetary policy shock along with the real marginal cost of loans.  If the model were 
to allow for investment financed externally at the margin, the procyclical external finance premium 
would attenuate the effect of monetary stimulus on investment. As it stands, a net attenuation is 
present in the model because effort is drawn into banking with the expansion of goods production.  
The procyclical effect on the external finance premium reflects the fact that monetary stimulus on 
consumption is accompanied by an increased demand for banking services to accommodate the 
demand for bank deposits. The net effect depicted in Figure 1 contrasts with the countercyclical 
finding in the work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), among others, in part because they 
neglect the direct relationship between consumption and the demand for bank deposits through the 
demand for money. 
  Figure 2 reports the results of a highly-persistent money growth shock that generates a 
highly persistent 1 percent rate of inflation, nearly twice the peak response of inflation in Figure 1. 
The higher rate of inflation in this case neutralizes much of the impact on consumption, which now 
rises by only 0.1 percent before it begins to fall. Hours worked in goods production and the real 
wage peak after a lag at only 0.2 percent above the steady state, respectively. However, the q price 
of capital still rises by around 0.4 percent and remains persistently elevated. The increased value of 
capital collateral relative to consumption allows broad liquidity constraint (25) to be satisfied with a 
substantial decline of nearly 0.5 percent of hours worked in banking.   
  Figure 2 shows that the net effect, according to (23), of m, w, and c is to lower the external 
finance premium persistently by as much 0.4 percentage points.  R
IB rises by 1.4 percentage points 
                                                 
25 The reported decline in R
IB is relative to the steady-state.  We interpret this simulation under the condition that the 
steady-state rate of inflation is sufficiently positive that R
IB remains above the zero bound.   29
on impact reflecting the sum of inflation expectations and the countercyclical external finance 
premium.  The banking “accelerator” effect on monetary stimulus in this case reflects the fact that 
the banking sector requires less work effort to satisfy the increased demand for bank deposits, so 
that the real marginal cost of loan production falls. The present discounted value of the persistently 
elevated future marginal product of capital keeps the q price of capital high enough on impact to 
overcome the presence of the banking attenuator and support a net banking accelerator.  
   The mechanics of the banking accelerator are much the same as in Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999), and others, where a countercyclical external finance premium amplifies and 
propagates monetary policy shocks through a positive feedback loop that involves the monetary 
stimulus, asset returns, the q price of capital, and the consumption value of loan collateral. The 
difference is that in our model the accelerator effects are overridden by the attenuator in the case at 
hand.  As currently specified, our model is perhaps unduly favorable to the attenuator in that all 
output is consumed and the velocity of bank deposits with respect to consumption is assumed 
constant.  Realistic modifications of the model—allowing output to be invested and the velocity of 
deposits to vary—could shift the balance considerably.  
  We now proceed to ask: How much could a central bank that ignores money and banking 
misjudge the proper interest rate policy action to stabilize inflation in response to a goods 
productivity shock?  We answer by comparing the responses of the real natural interbank rate of 
interest to a goods productivity shock in the model with and without money and banking. We do 
this by utilizing interest rate policy rule (34) with µ1 = 50, µ2 = 0, and µ3 = 0.  With its strong 
response to inflation, this specification keeps inflation approximately equal to zero, which, given 
(32), stabilizes real marginal cost mc of goods production at its steady-state value. Thus, this 
specification of the interest rate rule essentially makes nominal interest rates behave like real natural   30
interest rates consistent with the underlying imperfectly competitive real business cycle model with 
flexible prices and a constant profit-maximizing markup.  
  In this context, we introduce a 1 percent shock to a highly-persistent first-order 
autoregressive goods productivity process with AR coefficient 0.99.  The impulse responses shown 
in Figure 3 indicate that the following endogenous variables are nearly invariant to the shock: n, dp, 
R
T, and R
B. The model has log utility and non-storable output, so we would expect hours worked in 
goods production to be relatively insensitive to the highly-persistent shock to the level of 
productivity in goods production. The inflation rate is essentially stabilized, as is the benchmark 
nominal interest rate R
T according to (16), because expected inflation and the expected change in λ 
are approximately zero.  The relative stability of 
T R  reflects the fact that desired household saving 
is relatively insensitive to the highly persistent shock to the level of productivity.   
  The striking contrast is that c, w, q, m, and the external finance premium all rise persistently 
by 0.6 or 0.7 percent. Why? With hours in goods production relatively stable, increased productivity 
shows up as a percent jump in consumption approximately equal to labor’s share. The jump in the 
wage reflects the increase in labor productivity.  And the q price of capital reflects the highly 
persistent increase in the marginal product of capital. The increase in banking hours reflects the 
increased demand for deposits associated with the rise in consumption via the linearized broad 
liquidity constraint (40).  The small decrease in hours worked in goods production partly reflects the 
increase in banking hours. As a result, the external finance premium jumps by 0.6 percentage 
points.  
  These results reveal a striking quantitative effect of the presence of money and banking in 
the model.  A central bank unaware of the effect of money and banking on interest rate spreads in 
general and on the interbank rate in particular would expect all real natural interest rates to behave 
like R
T.  Hence, a central bank determined to make its interbank rate policy instrument shadow   31
movements in the real natural rate, so as to stabilize inflation perfectly, would move its interbank 
rate relatively little in response to a highly persistent productivity shock.  Yet, the model with 
money and banking requires the central bank to cut its interbank rate by around 0.6 percentage 
points to stabilize inflation fully in response to such a shock. That amounts to a 2.4 annualized 
percentage point misjudgment of the desired interbank rate policy action. 
  What if the central bank followed a version of the Taylor rule without smoothing? To find 
out, we compute impulse responses to a 1 percent positive goods productivity shock with AR 
coefficient 0.99, but with interest rate rule (34) calibrated as µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 0.5, and µ3 = 0. The 
striking result reported in Figure 4 is that this rule permits 2 percent deflation that is highly 
protracted!  The deflation is associated with a persistent decline in real marginal cost (an elevated 
markup) in goods production. Expected deflation pushes all three nominal interest rates sharply 
lower. Hours in goods production, consumption, the wage, and the price of capital are all marginally 
lower than in Figure 3.  The key banking variables, monitoring effort and the external finance 
premium, are both persistently higher under the specified rule.  
  Inclusion of money and banking, then, makes this version of the Taylor rule deflationary. If 
money and banking was costless, then there would be a single interest rate in the model, R
T.  And 
the associated real interest rate would move little in response to the highly persistent goods 
productivity shock.  (The permanent income theory of consumption says that aggregate demand 
would increase to absorb most of the increase in aggregate supply without much variation in the real 
interest rate.) Hence, the output gap would be small, and deflation could be averted with a relatively 
small cut in the interest rate.  
  According to our calibration, however, the real interbank rate must fall significantly relative 
to the real benchmark rate, R
T.  However, the Taylor rule says that the real interbank rate cannot fall 
if inflation and the output gap are stabilized. Hence, in dynamic equilibrium the economy must   32
settle at a point where there is just enough of an output gap and deflation for the Taylor rule to 
induce a cut in the real interbank rate to satisfy equilibrium in the banking sector.  Thus, our model 
of money and banking suggests the existence of a quantitatively significant problem for plausible 
versions of the Taylor rule.
26   
  Our remaining examples of the quantitative consequences of money and banking involve 
two shocks that emanate from the banking sector itself and thus have no counterpart in the usual 
NNS model: a shock to the productivity of monitoring effort and a shock to effective collateral.  
  The detrended productivity of monitoring effort in banking is represented by a2t in the 
linearized broad liquidity constraint (40), and is determined exogenously by a first-order AR 
process. We assume an AR coefficient of 0.99 for the banking productivity shock to capture the 
near-permanent nature of surprising improvements or disappointments in technological progress in 
banking. Assuming the same specification as in Figure 3 for the interest rate rule employed to 
stabilize inflation fully, Figure 5 displays impulse responses to a one percent banking productivity 
shock. As expected, the inflation rate is stabilized reasonably well, as are R
T and R
IB.  Hours worked 
in banking falls by 0.85 percent in response to improved productivity in banking.  There is little 
change in the q value of collateral, and therefore little effect on the supply of loans for given hours 
worked in banking. The fall in m, together with the negligible change in the wage and the small 
increase in consumption, produces a 0.9 percentage point fall in the external finance premium, 
which is reflected in an equivalent rise in R
IB.  This means that a 1 percent improvement in banking 
technology requires the central bank to raise its real interbank rate policy instrument by 3.6 
percentage points at an annual rate to stabilize inflation.   
                                                 
26 In this regard, the potential for large mistaken interbank rate policy actions might be reduced if the model were 
modified to allow banks to acquire government bonds as assets. As currently specified, banks do not borrow in the 
interbank market in order to hold government bonds outright.  Since a bank would incur little loan production costs on 
either side of this arbitrage, a bank could profit by utilizing funds borrowed in the interbank market to buy government 
bills as long as R
B exceeded R
IB. 
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  Here again money and banking potentially matter a great deal quantitatively for interest rate 
policy. A central bank unaware of the consequences of money and banking that wished to shadow 
the natural real interbank rate to stabilize inflation would miss completely the need to raise its 
interbank rate instrument to do so. The central bank would be surprised at the resulting strength of 
economic activity and inflationary pressure.  Impulse responses not reported here show that a 
central bank following the Taylor rule of Figure 4 would in this case create inflation persistently in 
excess of 0.5 percent.
27   
  For our last experiment we consider a shock meant to capture the consequences of financial 
distress that weakens a borrower’s property rights to his capital, thereby making capital less 
productive in securing and producing loans.  We model financial distress as a shock to k in (6), 
which shows up as a shock to a3t in the linearized equations (38) and (40). We assume that a3t is 
generated as an exogenous first-order AR process with AR coefficient of 0.9 to reflect modest 
persistence associated with resolving financial distress.  Again, we specify the interest rate rule as 
above to stabilize inflation fully in order to illustrate the effect of financial distress on the natural 
interbank rate of interest.  
  Figure 6 displays impulse responses to a 1 percent negative shock to effective collateral.  
The inflation rate is stabilized reasonably well, as are R
T and R
B. Hours worked in banking rise by 
1.2 percent in response to the decline in effective collateral. This rise in m, together with the 
implied small changes in c and w, produces a 1.2 percentage point rise in the external finance 
premium, reflected in an equivalent fall in the natural real interbank interest rate.  
                                                 
27 Again, there are reasons why shocks to banking technology need not precipitate such large movements in the natural 
interbank rate. First, the natural interbank rate is invariant to productivity shocks when banking and goods productivity 
trend upward together as in the steady state.  Second, the variance of detrended banking productivity shocks that move 
independently of goods productivity shocks might be relatively small, with modest implications for the natural 
interbank rate. Third, if banks were allowed to hold government securities outright in the model, then arbitrage between 
R
IB and R
B would induce banks to sell government securities in response to the positive banking productivity shock, 
which would mitigate the rise in the natural interbank rate.   34
  Once more, developments relating to money and banking potentially matter a great deal for 
interest rate policy. In this case, it is implausible that a central bank would remain unaware of the 
money and banking shock. Evidence of financial distress would be directly observable and reported 
in the media. Central banks generally recognize the need to cut the interbank rate in response to 
widespread financial distress. But, given the absence of money and banking in models of monetary 
policy, there is no way to judge how much to cut the interbank interest rate.  
  The simulation indicates that a 1 percentage point decline in effective collateral would 
require an initial 4.8 annualized percentage point cut in the interbank interest rate followed by a 
gradual return to neutral.  This sensitivity of the natural interbank rate to widespread financial 
distress seems large in the sense that central banks rarely make such immediate, deep cuts in the 
interbank rate, even in response to a financial crisis.   
  To get a more realistic idea of the effect of financial distress, we consider a more realistic 
interest rate rule in Figure 7.  Figure 7 displays impulse responses to the negative collateral shock 
when monetary policy is governed by a specification of interest rate policy (34) reflective of a  
Taylor rule with a lagged interest rate: µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 0.5, and µ3 = 0.8.  In this case, interest rate 
smoothing delays the cut in the interbank rate, which reaches a trough after about one year only 2.5 
percentage points p.a. below neutral.  Realistic interest rate policy produces more realistic 
macroeconomic outcomes: there is a recession with a 2 percent contraction in hours worked and a 2 
percent per annum deflation. From this perspective, the sensitivity of the natural real interbank rate 
to the effective collateral shock evident in the simulation may not be implausibly large. 
  In fact, financial distress is likely to be accompanied by a flight to safety resulting  in an 
increased demand for bank deposits relative to consumption. The decline in velocity would cause an 
even larger fall in the natural interbank rate than in Figure 6.  On the other hand, if banks were 
allowed to hold government securities outright in the model, then arbitrage between R
IB and R
B   35
would induce banks to buy government securities in response to the financial distress.  Such 
arbitrage would bring down R
B and R
T, cushion the decline in R
IB, and improve the capacity of the 
model economy to respond to financial distress.
28  
9. Conclusions 
  We conclude with a brief summary of the paper’s scope and findings.  Our objective was to 
reconsider the role of money and banking in monetary policy analysis by means of an analytical 
framework that includes both a banking sector and transaction-facilitating money in an optimizing 
model that is otherwise of the standard new neoclassical synthesis type.  The addition of the 
banking sector leads to several unusual features, including a number of distinct interest rates.  The 
model is implemented quantitatively, based on a calibration that attempts (within specificational 
constraints) to be realistic for an economy such as that of the United States.   
  Results obtained are of two types, pertaining to steady-state and dynamic properties of the 
model.  In the former case we are reasonably successful in providing an endogenous explanation for 
substantial steady-state differentials between the short-term interbank interest rate, typically 
employed as the central bank’s policy instrument, and the following: (i) the collateralized loan rate, 
(ii) the uncollateralized loan rate, (iii) the one-period government bond rate, (iv) the net marginal 
product of capital, and (v) a shadow nominal purely intertemporal rate, i.e., our “benchmark” rate.  
One steady-state experiment involves a counterfactual calibration that makes banking services 
almost costless to produce; this scenario results in interbank and bond rates that are 4 percentage 
points per annum higher than with our baseline calibration, thereby indicating a major quantitative 
effect of a banking sector.  Effects on the steady-state capital stock are also sizeable; with costless 
banking services, the capital stock is over 5 percent lower than in the baseline calibration.  Among 
other results, in the baseline calibration we find a differential of over 3 percentage points per annum 
                                                 
28 In this context, footnotes 25 and 26 are relevant.   36
between short-term interest rates and the return to capital, a magnitude that may contribute 
significantly to resolving the famous “equity premium puzzle.”  Finally, we report experiments with 
the baseline calibration that indicate a sizable sensitivity of the steady-state “neutral” interbank rate 
to the debt to GDP ratio and to the velocity of aggregate bank deposits.   
  Dynamic results are based on impulse response functions implied by a linearized version of 
the model.  Here we demonstrate the quantitative significance of a “banking attenuator” effect that 
works in the opposite direction from the “financial accelerator” effects emphasized by Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)—although these effects are also present in the model.     
  One of the more significant findings in this dynamic context is that, according to the model, 
a central bank that based its rate-setting policy on analysis that failed to recognize the distinction 
between the interbank rate and the benchmark intertemporal rate could miss its appropriate settings 
by as much as 4 percentage points.  For instance, we show that a central bank that utilized an 
interbank interest rate instrument, with parameters chosen to represent a moderate version of the 
Taylor (1993) rule, would produce a persistent 2 percent per annum deflation in response to a 1 
percent, highly-persistent positive shock to productivity in goods production.   
  Finally, we demonstrate the quantitative consequences of two shocks emanating from the 
banking sector itself: a shock to banking productivity and a shock to effective collateral reflecting 
financial distress.  For instance, we indicate that the central bank would need to cut the real 
interbank rate initially by nearly 5 percentage points per annum to fully stabilize inflation and 
output against a moderately persistent, 1 percent decline in effective collateral. Moreover, we show 
that a more realistic policy response reflecting instead a Taylor-style rule with interest rate 
smoothing fails to offset the contractionary consequences of financial distress, instead permitting a 
recession with 2 percent per annum deflation and a 2 percent contraction in employment. In short, 
in our calibrated model, the effects of money and banking are quantitatively of major importance.      37
Table 1: Steady-State Calibrations 
  
Benchmark Calibration 
(quarterly data; zero inflation) 
 c                    m                     n                 w                  λ                      Ω                     Κ 
      0.8409       0.0063       0.3195        1.949      0.457       0.237       9.19 
 
             R
T                            R
IB                            R
L                                          R
B                                      CEFP 
         0.015           0.0021           0.0066           0.0052          0.0045 
 
Highly Efficient Banking  
(Same calibration as above except F = 90.) 
          c                     m                     n                    w                    λ                     Ω                     Κ 
      0.8490         0.000       0.3276       1.894       0.471      0.249       8.69 
 
             R
T                                            R
IB                                        R
L                                            R
B                                  CEFP 
         0.015             0.015           0.015              0.015            0.00 
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